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On July 25, Twitter ‘withheld’ or disabled access to two tweets made by activist
lawyer Prashant Bhushan. Prashant Bhushan had posted two tweets in the end of
June, criticizing the Supreme Court and especially its current Chief Justice. Based
on the Tweets, the Supreme Court initiated suo moto contempt proceedings against
Bhushan on July 21 and Twitter’s withdrawal comes two days after the first hearing
in the case. 
The withdrawal of the Tweets in the absence of a court order asking Twitter to
remove the content is a dangerous precedent for online free speech in India.
Twitter’s decision is especially problematic as it is not in consonance with the
content takedown guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court in Shreya Singhal
v. Union of India. In the Shreya Singhal case, the Court laid down that online
intermediaries must take down content only upon receipt of a Court Order or
Government Notification asking them to do so. In this case, however, there has
never been a court order but just the opening of proceedings. Twitter acted in
anticipatory obedience.
Background
On June 27, Bhushan tweeted that when historians look at how Indian democracy
was destroyed between 2014 and 2020, they would particularly mark the role of
the Supreme Court and particularly that of the last four Chief Justices. On June
29, Bhushan tweeted a viral picture of Chief Justice Bobde on a Harley Davidson
motorcycle. He said that the Chief Justice was riding a 50 lakh rupees motorcycle
belonging to a BJP leader without wearing a mask or helmet, while keeping the
Supreme Court in lockdown and denying citizens their right to access justice. It
emerged from news reports that the motorcycle was registered to the son of BJP
leader Sonba Musale (ruling party at the Centre). 
Suo Moto Contempt Petition 
On July 21, a bench headed by Justice Arun Mishra initiated suo moto proceedings
against Prashant Bhushan for committing the offence of contempt of court. Suo
moto proceedings, under Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act of 1971 are
proceedings initiated by the Supreme Court on its own initiation when it believes or
discovers that the offence of criminal contempt of court has been committed. The
charge against Mr. Bhushan was that he allegedly scandalised the court and brought
the administration of justice in disrepute. 
While hearing the case on the next day, Justice Arun Mishra asked Twitter’s counsel
Senior Advocate Sajan Poovayya why Twitter had not disabled the content on its
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own after contempt proceedings were initiated. Justice Mishra asked why Twitter
was waiting for a “formal order of the Court to do so” and said that the Court may
leave the removal to Twitter’s wisdom. To this, Mr. Poovayya clarified that Twitter did
not defend the tweet and that that he would convey the Court’s suggestion to Twitter.
It is pertinent to note that this was merely a verbal exchange between the judges
and the counsels. The Court Order from the hearing did not contain any direction for
Twitter to take down the Tweets. The Court issued notice to the Attorney General
and Twitter Inc. to hear their arguments in the matter and listed the matter for next
hearing on August 5.  
Twitter ‘withholds’ tweets 
On July 25, two days after the hearing, Twitter ‘withheld’ the tweets from Mr.
Bhushan’s Twitter profile. Mr. Bhushan’s profile now contains a message from
Twitter saying that the tweets have been “withheld in response to a legal demand”.
Twitter’s Rules on Withholding Content explains that this message is displayed
when Twitter “is compelled to withhold the original Tweet “in response to a valid
legal demand, such as a court order”. Twitter’s counsel Mr. Poovayya explained in
an interview that as per Twitter, ‘withholding’ the tweet did not amount to deletion
and that Twitter kept the option open of restoring the Tweet following a final decision
of the Court.  
The key question here is that if the Court had not yet made a final order on the issue,
did Twitter jump the gun by unilaterally withholding the Tweets? 
A courtroom exchange is not a court order
In the hearing on July 22, Justice Mishra suggested that Twitter should have taken
down Mr. Bhushan’s Tweets when it found out that the Supreme Court initiated suo
moto contempt proceedings. This suggestion was problematic and appears to go
against the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the landmark case of Shreya
Singhal v. Union of India (2015). 
In Shreya Singhal’s case, the Supreme Court interpreted Section 79 of the
Information Technology Act, 2008 and Rule 3 of the Intermediary Liability Rules,
2011 to hold that online intermediaries were required to take down harmful
content only upon receipt of a court order or a notification from a Government
agency. The Court clarified that online intermediaries were not obligated to
undertake any takedown/removal action upon receipt of third parties’ complaints.
The Court’s reasoning was based on removing the obligation from online
intermediaries of deciding which content was unlawful. It was also based on the
understanding that private intermediaries were not the arbiters of truth to determine
the limits of the right to free speech under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of
India. 
Thus, as per Shreya Singhal’s case, online intermediaries are only supposed to
take down content upon receipt of a court order or government notification to do so.
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However, in Mr. Bhushan’s case, the court order did not contain any such direction.
In contravention to the direction in Shreya Singhal, the takedown occurred based on
the courtroom exchange between the counsels and the Court. 
The requirement of a court order to take down content is important and cannot be
substituted by a courtroom exchange. A court order is significantly different from
a courtroom exchange as courtroom exchange is a part of the process that leads
to a final decision. In contrast, a court order is such a final decision, demonstrating
that the judges have concluded after hearing the parties, determining the facts and
considering the law on the issue. 
By expecting Twitter to take down the content merely when the contempt
proceedings were initiated, the Supreme Court ignored that it was jumping to a
conclusion of Mr. Bhushan’s guilt and denying him the opportunity of being heard.
Thus, the Court’s suggestion of preliminary takedown was faulty and unjustified. 
Twitter’s subsequent withdrawal creates a
dangerous precedent
Twitter’s unilateral withdrawal of the Tweets on Saturday has made a bad situation
worse and has set a dangerous precedent for free speech and online content
moderation. The rationale of the Supreme Court’s decision in Shreya Singhal v.
Union of India was that hosting providers and social media platforms like Twitter
did not have an obligation of monitoring all content on their platform and were only
required to take down content after a court order or government notification on the
issue. By disabling access to the tweets before such a final adjudication it may
be said that Twitter has created a dangerous precedent for itself and other online
intermediaries. It may be argued that by disabling the tweets without a court order,
Twitter has conceded that online intermediaries may be expected to take down
contemptuous or defamatory content at the very moment that any court proceedings
are initiated against them. It would be antithetical to judicial accountability and
the very concept of free speech if courts could shield themselves from scrutiny
and criticism simply by initiating suo moto proceedings that would instantly lead
to a takedown of such criticism. Further, if the same logic of taking down content
without an explicit court order were to be applied to defamation proceedings between
individuals, it would lead to a massive chilling effect. Thus, it could be argued that by
disabling access to the tweets, Twitter has acted prematurely and damaged Shreya
Singhal’s protection to hosting providers and online intermediaries.
Conclusion
With the advent of technology, social media platforms have become instrumental
in facilitating democratic discourse in a nation, and preserving freedom of speech.
However, Article 19(2) of the Constitution of India envisages that the Courts
determine the limits of free speech, not private intermediaries.  Private platforms
lack the legal legitimacy to become arbiters of truth and Twitter’s withdrawal of
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Mr. Bhushan’s Tweets in the absence of a written court order sets a dangerous
precedent for free speech. 
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